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THIS WIKI IS NOW MAINTAINED AT https://github.com/nowsecure/r2frida/wiki

r2frida-wiki

Before reading this tutorial, it's highly recommended that you first take a look at the official website of r2frida to install the tool as well as understand the capabilities of this one.

Android & iOS Connection

Retrieve the device id using frida-ls-devices and the name of the app using frida-ps. The package name may be preferable if the display name contains spaces.

Attach

Attach to a running app using the display name.

r2 frida://device-id/Snapchat

Attach to the Frida Gadget:

r2 frida://attach/usb//Gadget

Spawn

Spawn an app using two // and the package name.

r2 frida://device-id//com.snapchat.android

Or explicitly using the word spawn:

r2 frida://spawn/usb/device-id/com.android.app

Or without entering the device-id:

r2 frida://spawn/usb//com.android.app

Commands (\?)

In order to get the list of commands, you might want to type: \?. Remember that all r2frida commands must start with \ or =!.

imaing

Version commands

To display the r2 version:

[0x00000000]> ?V
3.6.0-git aka 3.5.0-27-g2bba203eb commit 21781

To display the Frida version:

[0x00000000]> \?V
{"version":"12.5.3"}
[0x00000000]> =!?V
{"version":"12.5.3"}

Informative commands (\i)

[0x00000000]> \?~^i
i                          Show target information
ii[*]                      List imports
il                         List libraries
is[*] <lib>                List symbols of lib (local and global ones)
iE[*] <lib>                Same as is, but only for the export global ones
iEa[*] (<lib>) <sym>       Show address of export symbol
isa[*] (<lib>) <sym>       Show address of symbol
ic <class>                 List Objective-C classes or methods of <class>
ip <protocol>              List Objective-C protocols or methods of <protocol>

[0x00000000]> \i
arch  arm
bits  64
os  linux
pid  14473
uid  10127
objc  false
java  true
cylang  false

[0x00000000]> \i*
e asm.arch=arm
e asm.bits=64
e asm.os=linux

[0x00000000]> \ii libssl.so~+aes
0x7f9419f510 f EVP_aes_128_cbc /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a2740 f EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3 /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a3314 f EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a3320 f EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a332c f EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f9419f5b8 f EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a274c f EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3 /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a3338 f EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a3344 f EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a3350 f EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f941a335c f EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f9419f5c4 f EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm /system/lib64/libcrypto.so
0x7f9419f600 f EVP_has_aes_hardware /system/lib64/libcrypto.so

[0x00000000]> \ii* libssl.so~+aes
f sym.imp.EVP_aes_128_cbc = 0x7f9419f510
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = 0x7f941a2740
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = 0x7f941a3314
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = 0x7f941a3320
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = 0x7f941a332c
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm = 0x7f9419f5b8
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = 0x7f941a274c
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = 0x7f941a3338
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = 0x7f941a3344
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = 0x7f941a3350
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = 0x7f941a335c
f sym.imp.EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm = 0x7f9419f5c4
f sym.imp.EVP_has_aes_hardware = 0x7f9419f600

[0x00000000]> \il~+keystore,ssl,crypto
0x0000007f94133000 libcrypto.so
0x0000007f93059000 libssl.so
0x0000007f879d8000 libjavacrypto.so
0x0000007f879d3000 libkeystore-engine.so
0x0000007f87985000 libkeystore_binder.so
0x0000007f5c491000 libvisacrypto.so

[0x00000000]> \iE
Do you want to print 111759 lines? (y/N) n

Filtering by library name:

[0x00000000]> \iE libssl.so~AES
0x7f9307afb4 f SSL_CIPHER_is_AES256CBC
0x7f9307af64 f SSL_CIPHER_is_AES
0x7f9307af8c f SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM
0x7f9307af9c f SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128GCM
0x7f9307afa8 f SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128CBC

Filtering by library name in r2 form: (notice the *)

[0x00000000]> \iE* libssl.so~AES
f sym.fun.SSL_CIPHER_is_AES256CBC = 0x7f9307afb4
f sym.fun.SSL_CIPHER_is_AES = 0x7f9307af64
f sym.fun.SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM = 0x7f9307af8c
f sym.fun.SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128GCM = 0x7f9307af9c
f sym.fun.SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128CBC = 0x7f9307afa8

[0x00000000]> \iEa libDexHelper.so JNI_OnLoad
0xd1c2b859

[0x00000000]> \iEa* libDexHelper.so JNI_OnLoad
f sym.JNI_OnLoad = 0xd1c2b859

[0xd5d26859]> \is libc.so~sprintf
0x0 f bionic/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/stdio/asprintf.c
0x0 f bionic/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/stdio/vasprintf.c
0x0 f bionic/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/stdio/vsprintf.c
0x0 f bionic/libc/bionic/__vsprintf_chk.cpp
0x0 f bionic/libc/stdio/sprintf.c
0xf5140be5 f asprintf
0xf5142dbd f vasprintf
0xf5148da9 f vsprintf
0xf5153c01 f __vsprintf_chk
0xf5153c29 f __sprintf_chk
0xf5155885 f sprintf

[0xd5d26859]> \isa sprintf
0xf5155885

[0x00000000]> \ic
Do you want to print 5769 lines? (y/N) n

Filtering by keyword (e.g package name):

[0x00000000]> \ic~+security
android.security.net.config.TrustAnchor
android.security.net.config.UserCertificateSource
android.security.net.config.CertificatesEntryRef
android.security.net.config.DirectoryCertificateSource$CertSelector
android.security.net.config.RootTrustManager
android.security.net.config.PinSet
android.security.net.config.CertificateSource
android.security.keystore.AndroidKeyStoreProvider
android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig$Builder
android.security.net.config.ApplicationConfig
android.security.NetworkSecurityPolicy

Search commands (\/)

[0x00000000]> \?~^/
/[x][j] <string|hexpairs>  Search hex/string pattern in memory ranges (see search.in=?)
/w[j] string               Search wide string
/v[1248][j] value          Search for a value honoring `e cfg.bigendian` of given width

[0x00000000]> \/ rooted
...
Searching 6 bytes in [0x0000007f95e1a000-0x0000007f95ebb000]
...
Searching 6 bytes in [0x0000007fc74a5000-0x0000007fc7ca4000]
hits: 9
0x7f595ec8e7 hit1_0 rootediso8601DateFormatissuerAccessCodeissuerActionCod
0x7f5e8aceb5 hit1_1 rooted devices for data security reasons.:Operation excepti
0x7f69566fa9 hit1_2 rooted?EECan not capture your card details, NFC feature is
0x7f6956f976 hit1_3 rooted or jailbroken. This is an added security measure to p
0x7f695763ac hit1_4 rooted to keep your details safe AndroidPay utilizes the m
0x7f69583dca hit1_5 rooted).T
0x7f6958dc30 hit1_6 rooted or jailbroken.Z
0x7f6958e011 hit1_7 rooted).
0x7f6991d8e7 hit1_8 rootediso8601DateFormatissuerAccessCodeissuerActionCod

Search string keyword and output in JSON format:

[0x00000000]> \/j rooted
Searching 6 bytes in [0x0000007f95ebe000-0x0000007f95ebf000]
...
Searching 6 bytes in [0x0000007fc74a5000-0x0000007fc7ca4000]
hits: 9
[{"address":"0x7f595ec8e7","size":6,"flag":"hit2_0","content":"rootediso8601DateFormatissuerAccessCodeissuerActionCod"},{"address":"0x7f5e8aceb5","size":6,"flag":"hit2_1","content":"rooted devices for data security reasons.:Operation excepti"},{"address":"0x7f69566fa9","size":6,"flag":"hit2_2","content":"rooted?EECan not capture your card details, NFC feature is "},{"address":"0x7f6956f976","size":6,"flag":"hit2_3","content":"rooted or jailbroken. This is an added security measure to p"},{"address":"0x7f695763ac","size":6,"flag":"hit2_4","content":"rooted to keep your details safe AndroidPay utilizes the m"},{"address":"0x7f69583dca","size":6,"flag":"hit2_5","content":"rooted).T      "},{"address":"0x7f6958dc30","size":6,"flag":"hit2_6","content":"rooted or jailbroken.Z    "},{"address":"0x7f6958e011","size":6,"flag":"hit2_7","content":"rooted).      "},{"address":"0x7f6991d8e7","size":6,"flag":"hit2_8","content":"rootediso8601DateFormatissuerAccessCodeissuerActionCod"}]

Another example searching for potential whitebox cryptography implementations:

[0x00000000]> \/ whitebox
Searching 8 bytes in [0x0000007fa558c000-0x0000007fa558f000]
Searching 8 bytes in [0x0000007feee1a000-0x0000007fef619000]
hits: 7
0x7f6cf4481d hit1_0 whitebox_damagePKhPhi_Z15whitebox_repairPhS_i_Z16CryptoPP_
0x7f6cf44837 hit1_1 whitebox_repairPhS_i_Z16CryptoPP_GenKeysSs_Z16gen_random_b
0x7f6f27c81d hit1_2 whitebox_damagePKhPhi_Z15whitebox_repairPhS_i_Z16CryptoPP_
0x7f6f27c837 hit1_3 whitebox_repairPhS_i_Z16CryptoPP_GenKeysSs_Z16gen_random_b
0x7f6f8fd4f9 hit1_4 whiteboxed_key_gen.cG[fzM~=)j-#wTOL$C9
0x7f6fa185f0 hit1_5 whiteboxed_key_gen.c=j;h58Z\^X).ln|
0x7f7dcb7552 hit1_6 whitebox

Search hex string:

[0x00000000]> \/x c0ffee
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007f95ebf000-0x0000007f95ec2000]
...
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007fc74a5000-0x0000007fc7ca4000]
hits: 7
0x71100090 hit3_0 c0ffee
0x719a104c hit3_1 c0ffee
0x7f59df54ec hit3_2 c0ffee
0x7f5bfaf4ec hit3_3 c0ffee
0x7f6141bb52 hit3_4 c0ffee
0x7f61e7de68 hit3_5 c0ffee
0x7f87c07623 hit3_6 c0ffee

Search hex string and outputs in JSON format:

[0x00000000]> \/xj c0ffee
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007f95ebe000-0x0000007f95ebf000]
...
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007fc74a5000-0x0000007fc7ca4000]
hits: 7
[{"address":"0x71100090","size":3,"flag":"hit4_0","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x719a104c","size":3,"flag":"hit4_1","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x7f59df54ec","size":3,"flag":"hit4_2","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x7f5bfaf4ec","size":3,"flag":"hit4_3","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x7f6141bb52","size":3,"flag":"hit4_4","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x7f61e7de68","size":3,"flag":"hit4_5","content":"c0ffee"},{"address":"0x7f87c07623","size":3,"flag":"hit4_6","content":"c0ffee"}]

Search value v from a given width in bytes [1248]:

[0x00000000]> ? 1234
hex     0x4d2
string  "\xd2\x04"
[0x00000000]> \/v4 1234
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007f95ebe000-0x0000007f95ebf000]
...
Searching 3 bytes in [0x0000007fc74a5000-0x0000007fc7ca4000]
hits: 1076
0x7f95acfb23 hit2_1071 d2040000
0x7f95ad01d3 hit2_1072 d2040000
0x7f95e96a2b hit2_1073 d2040000
0x7f95e96b17 hit2_1074 d2040000
0x7f95e96f1f hit2_1075 d2040000
0x7f95e96fb3 hit2_1076 d2040000

Dynamic/Debugging commands (\d)

[0x00000000]> \?~^d
db (<addr>|<sym>)          List or place breakpoint
db- (<addr>|<sym>)|*       Remove breakpoint(s)
dc                         Continue breakpoints or resume a spawned process
dd[-][fd] ([newfd])        List, dup2 or close filedescriptors
dm[.|j|*]                  Show memory regions
dma <size>                 Allocate <size> bytes on the heap, address is returned
dmas <string>              Allocate a string inited with <string> on the heap
dmad <addr> <size>         Allocate <size> bytes on the heap, copy contents from <addr>
dmal                       List live heap allocations created with dma[s]
dma- (<addr>...)           Kill the allocations at <addr> (or all of them without param)
dmp <addr> <size> <perms>  Change page at <address> with <size>, protection <perms> (rwx)
dmm                        List all named squashed maps
dmh                        List all heap allocated chunks
dmhj                       List all heap allocated chunks in JSON
dmh*                       Export heap chunks and regions as r2 flags
dmhm                       Show which maps are used to allocate heap chunks
dp                         Show current pid
dpt                        Show threads
dr                         Show thread registers (see dpt)
dl libname                 Dlopen a library
dl2 libname [main]         Inject library using Frida's >= 8.2 new API
dt (<addr>|<sym>) ...      Trace list of addresses or symbols
dth (<addr>|<sym>) (x y..) Define function header (z=str,i=int,v=hex barray,s=barray)
dt-                        Clear all tracing
dtr <addr> (<regs>...)     Trace register values
dtf <addr> [fmt]           Trace address with format (^ixzO) (see dtf?)
dtSf[*j] [sym|addr]        Trace address or symbol using the stalker (Frida >= 10.3.13)
dtS[*j] seconds            Trace all threads for given seconds using the stalker
di[0,1,-1] [addr]          Intercept and replace return value of address
dx [hexpairs]              Inject code and execute it (TODO)
dxc [sym|addr] [args..]    Call the target symbol with given args

Set a dynamic breakpoint: (notice the field "stopped":false)

[0x00000000]> \db `\ii libtarget.so~dlsym[0]`
{
  "0x7f95e19548": {
    "name": "0x7f95e19548",
    "stopped": false,
    "address": "0x7f95e19548",
    "continue": false,
    "handler": {}
  }
}

Once the breakpoint is hit, we can tamper with memory at will (notice the field "stopped":true)

[0x00000000]> \db
{
  "0x7f95e19548": {
    "name": "0x7f95e19548",
    "stopped": true,
    "address": "0x7f95e19548",
    "continue": false,
    "handler": {}
  }
}

List all breakpoints:

[0x00000000]> \db
{
  "0x7f95e19548": {
    "name": "0x7f95e19548",
    "stopped": true,
    "address": "0x7f95e19548",
    "continue": false,
    "handler": {}
  },
  "0x7f942bf1e8": {
    "name": "0x7f942bf1e8",
    "stopped": false,
    "address": "0x7f942bf1e8",
    "continue": false,
    "handler": {}
  }
}

After inspecting memory, we continue the execution:

[0x00000000]> \dc
Continue 1 thread(s).

When breakpoints are no longer needed, they can be removed:

[0x00000000]> \db- *
All breakpoints removed
[0x00000000]> \db
{}

List of memory regions (JSON output in the second command)

[0x7f93059000]> \dm
Do you want to print 1708 lines? (y/N) n
[0x7f93059000]> \dmj
Do you want to print 1 lines? (y/N) n

Filter by library name:

[0x00000000]> \dm~ssl
0x0000007f618ee000 - 0x0000007f61929000 r-- /system/lib64/libssl.so
0x0000007f93059000 - 0x0000007f93091000 r-x /system/lib64/libssl.so
0x0000007f93092000 - 0x0000007f93094000 r-- /system/lib64/libssl.so
0x0000007f93094000 - 0x0000007f93095000 rw- /system/lib64/libssl.so

Filter by library name, enable the output to be in r2 format:

[0x7f93059000]> \dm*~ssl
f map.0x0000007f618ee000 = 0x7f618ee000 # r-- /system/lib64/libssl.so
f map.0x0000007f93059000 = 0x7f93059000 # r-x /system/lib64/libssl.so
f map.0x0000007f93092000 = 0x7f93092000 # r-- /system/lib64/libssl.so
f map.0x0000007f93094000 = 0x7f93094000 # rw- /system/lib64/libssl.so

Find out the memory region of the current offset:

[0x00000000]> s 0x0000007f93059000
[0x7f93059000]> \dm.
0x0000007f93059000 - 0x0000007f93091000 r-x /system/lib64/libssl.so

Without seeking into an offset:

[0x00000000]> \dm. @ 0x7f6f8fd4f9
0x0000007f6f8fd000 - 0x0000007f6fa56000 rw- /data/app/com.target.pay-1/lib/arm64/libvisacrypto.so

[0x00000000]> \dma 512
0xcb1777f0
[0x00000000]> x 512 @ 0xcb1777f0
- offset -   0 1  2 3  4 5  6 7  8 9  A B  C D  E F  0123456789ABCDEF
0xcb1777f0  0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0xcb177800  0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................

0x00000000]> \dmas r2fridaiscool
0xf3d7ee10
[0x00000000]> ps @ 0xf3d7ee10
r2fridaiscool
[0x00000000]> x @ 0xf3d7ee10
- offset -   0 1  2 3  4 5  6 7  8 9  A B  C D  E F  0123456789ABCDEF
0xf3d7ee10  7232 6672 6964 6169 7363 6f6f 6c00 f2ff  r2fridaiscool...
0xf3d7ee20  1800 0000 1300 0000 01a3 57de 0000 0000  ..........W.....
0xf3d7ee30  0000 0000 2300 0000 7265 2e66 7269 6461  ....#...re.frida
0xf3d7ee40  2e41 6765 6e74 436f 6e74 726f 6c6c 6572  .AgentController
0xf3d7ee50  3132 0000 1b00 0000 c050 d7f3 0300 0000  12.......P......

[0x00000000]> \dmal
0xf3d7ee10	"r2fridaiscoolW#re.frida.AgentContro"

Dynamic tracing (\dt) fopen:

[0x00000000]> \dt fopen; \dth fopen z; \dc
[TRACE] 0x7f942bf1e8 ( fopen ) ["/proc/self/maps"]
 - 0x7f5bf72d98 libtarget.so!scan_executable+0xf0
 - 0x7f5bf72d94 libtarget.so!scan_executable+0xec
 - 0x7f5bf721b4 libtarget.so!secchecks+0x90
 - 0x7f5bf6cdb8 libtarget.so!Java_com_super_secure_App+0x1710
 - 0x7f69e6a7e0 base.odex!oatexec+0x4e7e0

Dynamic tracing (\dt) strcmp:

 -- Insert coin to continue ...
[0x00000000]> \dt strcmp; \dth strcmp z z; \. agent.js ;\dc
undefined
[TRACE] 0x7f94267adc ( strcmp ) ["Landroid/app/ActivityThread;","Landroid/app/ActivityThread;"]
 - 0x7f91abdeac libart.so!0x11ceac
 - 0x7f91abdea8 libart.so!0x11cea8
 - 0x7f91ace8b0 libart.so!_ZN3art10ClassTable6LookupEPKcm+0x100
 - 0x7f91aa0b9c libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker11LookupClassEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmPNS_6mirror11ClassLoaderE+0xc4
 - 0x7f91aa0de8 libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker26FindClassInPathClassLoaderERNS_33ScopedObjectAccessAlreadyRunnableEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEEPPNS8_5ClassE+0xfc
 - 0x7f91aa0e7c libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker26FindClassInPathClassLoaderERNS_33ScopedObjectAccessAlreadyRunnableEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEEPPNS8_5ClassE+0x190
 - 0x7f91aa2234 libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker9FindClassEPNS_6ThreadEPKcNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEE+0x3b0
 - 0x7f91ca1e24 libart.so!0x300e24
 - 0x7f7b356884 frida-agent-64.so!0x177884
[TRACE] 0x7f94267adc ( strcmp ) ["Landroid/hardware/radio/RadioManager$ModuleProperties;","Landroid/hardware/radio/RadioManager$ModuleProperties;"]
 - 0x7f91abdeac libart.so!0x11ceac
 - 0x7f91abdea8 libart.so!0x11cea8
 - 0x7f91ace8b0 libart.so!_ZN3art10ClassTable6LookupEPKcm+0x100
 - 0x7f91aa0b9c libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker11LookupClassEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmPNS_6mirror11ClassLoaderE+0xc4
 - 0x7f91aa0de8 libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker26FindClassInPathClassLoaderERNS_33ScopedObjectAccessAlreadyRunnableEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEEPPNS8_5ClassE+0xfc
 - 0x7f91aa0e7c libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker26FindClassInPathClassLoaderERNS_33ScopedObjectAccessAlreadyRunnableEPNS_6ThreadEPKcmNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEEPPNS8_5ClassE+0x190
 - 0x7f91aa2234 libart.so!_ZN3art11ClassLinker9FindClassEPNS_6ThreadEPKcNS_6HandleINS_6mirror11ClassLoaderEEE+0x3b0
 - 0x7f91ca1e24 libart.so!0x300e24
 - 0x7f7b356884 frida-agent-64.so!0x177884

Dynamic tracing (\dt) unlink:

[0x00000000]> \dt unlink; \dth unlink z; \. agent.js ;\dc
[TRACE] 0x7f94274fe0 ( unlink ) ["/data/data/com.target.app/.   ​"]
 - 0x7f942a5824 libc.so!remove+0x58
 - 0x7f942a5820 libc.so!remove+0x54
 - 0x7f8c39f724 libopenjdk.so!Java_java_io_UnixFileSystem_delete0+0x5c
 - 0x720157dc boot.oat!oatexec+0x647dc
[TRACE] 0x7f94274fe0 ( unlink ) ["/data/data/com.target.app/.   "]
 - 0x7f942a5824 libc.so!remove+0x58
 - 0x7f942a5820 libc.so!remove+0x54
 - 0x7f8c39f724 libopenjdk.so!Java_java_io_UnixFileSystem_delete0+0x5c
 - 0x720157dc boot.oat!oatexec+0x647dc

Extra help:

[0x00000000]> \dtf?
Usage: dtf [format] || dtf [addr] [fmt]
  ^  = trace onEnter instead of onExit
  +  = show backtrace on trace
 p/x = show pointer in hexadecimal
  c  = show value as a string (char)
  i  = show decimal argument
  z  = show pointer to string
  s  = show string in place
  O  = show pointer to ObjC object
Undocumented: Z, S
 dtf	trace format

Tracing native wrappers with format (z= pointer to string) and adding backtracing (^):

[0x00000000]> \dtf fopen z^; \dtf dlopen z^;
[0x00000000]> \dc
resumed spawned process.
[TRACE] dtf	dlopen	(0: "libc.so")	0x7f908b4668	libshella-2.9.0.5.so	0xfffffffff9d91668
	0x7f908b4664	libshella-2.9.0.5.so	0xfffffffff9d91664
	0x7f908b4b1c	libshella-2.9.0.5.so	JNI_OnLoad+0x124
	0x7f96b24bac	libshella-2.9.0.5.so	0x1bac
	0x7f97ecf650	libart.so	_ZN3art9JavaVMExt17LoadNativeLibrary<REDACTED>...9_+0x858
[TRACE] dtf     fopen   (0: "/proc/self/stat")  0x7f99409550    libc.so pthread_getattr_np+0xc4
	0x7f9940954c	libc.so	pthread_getattr_np+0xc0
	0x7f9744aedc	libBugly.so	javaStaticCall_Thread_CurrentThread+0x80
	0x7f9744b40c	libBugly.so	javaTheadDump+0x44
	0x7f9744be40	libBugly.so	getBuglyClassPathPrefix+0x48
	0x7f9744fd3c	libBugly.so	JNI_OnLoad+0x90
	0x7f97ecf650	libart.so	_ZN3art9JavaVMExt17LoadNativeLibrary<REDACTED>...9_+0x858
	0x7f9bdcb27c	libopenjdkjvm.so	JVM_NativeLoad+0x118
	0x7204cdd0	boot.oat	oatexec+0x9bdd0

error: Script is destroyed
error: Script is destroyed
[0xc3374000]> \dkr
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Build fingerprint: 'OnePlus/OnePlus5/OnePlus5:7.0/NRD90M/0131337:user/release-keys'
Revision: '0'
ABI: 'arm'
pid: 9207, tid: 9229, name: gum-js-loop  >>> com.target.application <<<
signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr --------
Abort message: '../../../glib/glib/gmem.c:106: failed to allocate 1037852 bytes'
    r0 00000000  r1 0000240d  r2 00000006  r3 00000008
    r4 ce47f978  r5 00000006  r6 ce47f920  r7 0000010c
    r8 00000000  r9 00000007  sl 0000e98d  fp 0000e98c
    ip 0000000c  sp ce47f268  lr e8d944b7  pc e8d96d38  cpsr 200f0010

backtrace:
    #00 pc 00000d38  /system/lib/libc.so (offset 0x49000)
    #01 pc 000264b3  /system/lib/libc.so (offset 0x21000)

Find a function to call to: (e.g. we search for an import in the Gadget)

[0x00000000]> \ii frida-gadget.so~gettimeofday
0xf40d8590 f gettimeofday /system/lib/libc.so

As we want to call the function int gettimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz); we would need two new structs. For doing so, we can allocate some memory in the heap of the process and get two pointers.

[0x00000000]> \dma 16
0xebaf6f18
[0x00000000]> \dma 16
0xebaf70d8

Finally we can call the function using the aforementioned pointers. The dxc command returns the return value of the function called.

[0x00000000]> \dxc 0xf40d8590 0xebaf6f18 0xebaf70d8
"0x0"

For this specific example, we can use the r2 command pt (print timestamp) to verify that the pointer got indeed populated with the timestamp. Hence, we have arbitrarily executed code within the process.

[0x00000000]> x 16 @ 0xebaf6f18
- offset -   0 1  2 3  4 5  6 7  8 9  A B  C D  E F  0123456789ABCDEF
0xebaf6f18  301e ae5c 0b6c 0200 0000 0000 0000 0000  0..\.l..........
[0x00000000]> pt 4 @ 0xebaf6f18
Wed Apr 10 17:47:44 2019

Evaluable Variables (\e)

[0x00000000]> \e
e patch.code=true
e search.in=perm:r--
e search.quiet=false
e stalker.event=compile
e stalker.timeout=300
e stalker.in=raw

Environment variables (\env)

Set env variable:

[0x00000000]> \env LD_PRELOAD=/data/local/tmp/libhook.so
LD_PRELOAD=/data/local/tmp/libhook.so

Get env variable:

[0x00000000]> \env LD_PRELOAD
LD_PRELOAD=/data/local/tmp/libhook.so

List all variables:

[0x00000000]> \env
PATH=/su/bin:/sbin:/vendor/bin:/system/sbin:/system/bin:/su/xbin:/system/xbin
ANDROID_BOOTLOGO=1
ANDROID_ROOT=/system
ANDROID_ASSETS=/system/app
ANDROID_DATA=/data
ANDROID_STORAGE=/storage
EXTERNAL_STORAGE=/sdcard
ASEC_MOUNTPOINT=/mnt/asec
ANDROID_SOCKET_zygote=9
ANDROID_LOG_TAGS=*:s

Frida Scripts (\. script.js)

JS code to be run in the target can be loaded with \. script.js. A common practice is always to call this script agent.js to remember that's the code to be run inside the target.

[0x00000000]> \. agent.js
[0x00000000]> \dc
resumed spawned process.

iOS

(This will have a large output.)

[0x00000000]> \ic
OS_dispatch_queue_attr
OS_dispatch_group
OS_dispatch_semaphore
OS_dispatch_mach
OS_dispatch_source
OS_dispatch_queue
OS_dispatch_queue_mgr
OS_dispatch_queue_network_event
OS_dispatch_queue_root
OS_dispatch_queue_main
OS_dispatch_queue_concurrent
OS_dispatch_queue_serial
OS_dispatch_queue_runloop
[0x00000000]>

List classes with a filter or keyword:

[0x00000000]> \ic ~UITouch
_UITouchObservation
_UITouchForceMessage
_UITouchForceObservationMessageReader
_DUITouchRoutingPolicy
UITouch
_UITouchForwardingRecipient
_UITouchPredictionManager
UITouchData
_UITouchForceInteractionProgress
_UITouchForceObservable
UITouchForceGestureRecognizer
_UITouchesObservingGestureRecognizer
UITouchesEvent
[0x00000000]>

List fields in one class:

[0x00000000]> \ic UITouch
0x000000018df1bf38 + _createTouchesWithGSEvent:phase:view:
0x0000000197826758 - pu_locationInPresentationLayerOfView:
0x000000019b18ab74 - locationInNode:
0x000000019b18acd0 - previousLocationInNode:
0x000000018db33858 - window
0x000000018db34794 - locationInView:
0x000000018db339f0 - phase
0x000000018db41d0c - .cxx_destruct
0x000000018db41cb8 - dealloc
0x000000018df1c170 - description
0x000000018db33ee0 - view
0x000000018db34da0 - timestamp
0x000000018db32924 - setWindow:
0x000000018dd230f4 - _setEaten:
0x000000018db33540 - _isEaten
[0x00000000]>

(This will have a large output.)

[0x00000000]> \ip
GVRenderer
CADSyncInterface
VKMapModelDelegate
SCNPhysicsBehaviorJSExport
GEOMapServiceProblemReportTicket
PXWidgetUnlockDelegate
ICMusicSubscriptionLeaseSessionDelegate
IKJSDOMCharacterData
ACDAccountAuthenticationPlugin
TUIDSLookup
FCOrderedCollectionAdditions
MSSubscribeStreamsProtocolDelegate
_DKEventStatsCounterInternalProperty
FBInterstitialAdNativeViewDelegate
[0x00000000]>

List protocols with a filter or keyword:

[0x00000000]> \ip ~Touch
GADNTouchHandling
UIScrollViewDelayedTouchesBeganGestureRecognizerClient
_UITouchPhaseChangeDelegate
_UIKBRTTouchDriftingDelegate
UIDebuggingInformationTouchObserver
WBSTouchIconObserver
BKSTouchDeliveryPolicyServerInterface
_UITouchForceObservationMessageReading
_UITouchable
_UIFocusEnginePanGestureTouchObserver
UIWebTouchEventsGestureRecognizerDelegate
_MKUserInteractionGestureRecognizerTouchObserver
FBAdTouchGestureRecognizerDelegate
_UIPreviewInteractionTouchForceProviding
[0x00000000]>

List methods of one protocol:

[0x00000000]> \ip GADNTouchHandling
- handleUserTouchMovedByVector:
[0x00000000]>

[0x00000000]> \dpt
1027
18947
26375
39687
37895
37635
36875
36359
34843
29187
33543
43527
86531
77827
63499
67347
68651
62491

[0x00000000]> \dr
tid 1027 waiting
 fp : 0x000000016eb66bb0	 lr : 0x0000000180c873e0	 pc : 0x0000000180c87568
 sp : 0x000000016eb66b60	 x0 : 0x000000016eb66cb8	 x1 : 0x0000000007000806
 x2 : 0x0000000000000000	 x3 : 0x0000000000000c00	 x4 : 0x0000000000004c03
 x5 : 0x00000000ffffffff	 x6 : 0x0000000000000000	 x7 : 0x00000000000003d0
 x8 : 0x00000000fffffbbf	 x9 : 0x0000000007000000	x10 : 0x0000000007000100
x11 : 0x0000000000000040	x12 : 0xffffffffffffffff	x13 : 0x0000000000000001
x14 : 0x0071180000711800	x15 : 0x0000000000000000	x16 : 0xffffffffffffffe1
x17 : 0x00000000ffffffff	x18 : 0xfffffff00fe9925c	x19 : 0x0000000000000000
x20 : 0x00000000ffffffff	x21 : 0x0000000000004c03	x22 : 0x0000000000000c00
x23 : 0x000000016eb66cb8	x24 : 0x0000000007000806	x25 : 0x0000000000000000
x26 : 0x0000000007000806	x27 : 0x0000000000000c00	x28 : 0x0000000000000001

tid 18947 waiting
 fp : 0x000000016f165d80	 lr : 0x0000000180c873e0	 pc : 0x0000000180c87568
 sp : 0x000000016f165d30	 x0 : 0x000000016f165e88	 x1 : 0x0000000007000806
 x2 : 0x0000000000000000	 x3 : 0x0000000000000c00	 x4 : 0x0000000000003203
 x5 : 0x00000000ffffffff	 x6 : 0x0000000000000000	 x7 : 0x0000000000000000
 x8 : 0x00000000fffffbbf	 x9 : 0x0000000007000000	x10 : 0x0000000007000100
x11 : 0x0000000000000040	x12 : 0xffffffffffffffff	x13 : 0x0000000000000001
x14 : 0x00019e0000019e00	x15 : 0x0000000000000000	x16 : 0xffffffffffffffe1
x17 : 0x00000000ffffffff	x18 : 0xfffffff00fe9925c	x19 : 0x0000000000000000
x20 : 0x00000000ffffffff	x21 : 0x0000000000003203	x22 : 0x0000000000000c00
x23 : 0x000000016f165e88	x24 : 0x0000000007000806	x25 : 0x0000000000000000
x26 : 0x0000000007000806	x27 : 0x0000000000000c00	x28 : 0x0000000000000001

...<REDACTED>...

tid 62499 waiting
 fp : 0x000000017199aaf0	 lr : 0x0000000180dbaeec	 pc : 0x0000000180ca8d80
 sp : 0x000000017199aa60	 x0 : 0x0000000000000040	 x1 : 0x000000017199ab80
 x2 : 0x0000000000000001	 x3 : 0x0000000000000000	 x4 : 0x000000000000001e
 x5 : 0x0000000000000020	 x6 : 0x0000000000000001	 x7 : 0x0000043fa8245c34
 x8 : 0x0000000000000001	 x9 : 0x0000000000000000	x10 : 0xffbffe0000000000
x11 : 0x0000001000000000	x12 : 0x0000000000000000	x13 : 0x00000000af75b1b0
x14 : 0x0000000000000000	x15 : 0x0000000000000000	x16 : 0x0000000000000170
x17 : 0x00000000ffffffe2	x18 : 0xfffffff00fe9925c	x19 : 0x000000017199b000
x20 : 0x00000000003c0021	x21 : 0x0000000000000021	x22 : 0x0000000000000001
x23 : 0x00000001b238e000	x24 : 0x0000000000002000	x25 : 0x0000000000080000
x26 : 0x0000000000000007	x27 : 0x00000001b238e000	x28 : 0x0000000000000000

Trace register(x1) at address 0x102d2e3f4

[0x00000000]> \dtr 0x102d2e3f4 x1

Once the address is hit, the register value is shown:

Trace probe hit at 0x102d2e3f4  (0x102d2e3f4) 0x19fd3e4
	x1 = 0x111243c80 ( user=eduardo;passwd=novella )